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Indians May Sue for Breach of Federal Trust Relationship: United States v. Mitchell' —
The legislative, 2 judicial,' and executive' branches of the federal government have long
recognized the existence of a special relationship between Indians and the federal gov-
ernment.' The Supreme Court has characterized this relationship as resembling a guar-
dianship, 6 as a guardianship,' as a fiduciary relationship,' and as a trust responsibility,'
but the exact nature and scope of this "trust relationship" have eluded judicial defini-
lion. 10 Courts have invoked 1 he trust relationship as a source of Congressional "plenary"
' 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
z See, e.g., General Allot mew Act of 1887 § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982); Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982).
• See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980); Shoshone Tribe v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall,
▪ Statement of President Reagan on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98 (Jan. 24,
1983); President Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS Or RICHARD
NixoN 564, 566 (July 8, 1970); H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1970); 116 CONC.
REC. 23258 (1970). See also letter from Leo M. Krulitz, Solicitor, United States Department of
Interior townies W. Moorman. Assistant United States Attorney General (Nov. 21, 1978), reprinted
in Brief for Respondent, Appendix, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Letter of Krulitz, Solicitor].
5 The source of this special relationship, to which this casenote will generally refer as a "trust"
relationship, is beyond the scope of this casenote. For a detailed treatment of the development of this
relationship by the judiciary, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Chambers]. See also Carter Race and Power
Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship over American Indians: Land Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM.
INn. L. REv, 197 (1976); AMERICAN 1NDIAN POLIC.Y REVIEW COMMISSION (TASK FORCE ONE), FINAL
REPORT: REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FEDERAL-INDIAN Rta.ArioNstur (Committee
Print ] 976).
" See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall, C. J.).
▪ See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 383-84 (1886). A guardianship is "the relation subsisting between guardian and ward." BtAcit's
LAW DICTIONARY 636 (5th ed. 1979). A guardian is defined as:
A person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of
the person and managing the property and rights of another person, who, for defect of
age, understanding, or self control, is considered incapable of administering his own
affairs. One who legally has the care and management of the person, or the estate, or
holh, of a child during its minority.
Id. at 635. A guardian resembles a trustee, but is not a trustee in the strict sense. 1 A. Scorr, THE LAW
Of TRUSTS § 7 (3d ed. 1965) {hereinafter cited as A. Scorr].
See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 397 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
9 See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). A trust is defined as:
"A fiduciary relation with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the property is held to
equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person which arises as the result
of a manifestation of an intention to create it." litAcies LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (5th ed. 1979).
'" See, e.g., Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964). The
court stated:
We do not discuss the question or whether, and to what extent, the United States had, in
general, the technical status of guardian or fiduciary toward its Indian dependents  
It is unimportant, in this case, to characterize [the obligation owed the Indians by the
federal government] precisely. Whether the responsibility be termed that of a guar-
dian, a fiduciary, a trustee, a protector, or of a superior sovereign to a dependent
people, the duty of care imposed upon the [government] would be the same.
Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
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power over Indian affairs," similar in scope to the police power exerted by state govern-
ments," a power subject only " to limitations inhering in a guardianship and to
pertinent constitutional restrictions.' ..13
Only recently, however, have the courts considered whether the trust relationship
bet ween Indians and the federal government creates legally enforceable fiduciary duties
on the part of the United States. Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell /), 14
 several lower court decisions had held the govern-
ment liable in money damages for breach of its fiduciary duties to Indians or Indian
tribes. 15
 Construing statutes authorizing federal management of Indian property liberally
in favor of the Indians because of the federal-Indian trust relationship, and borrowing
from the common law of trusts, these courts imposed fiduciary duties on the federal
government in excess of express statutory duties.'" The courts assumed that breaches of
these duties gave rise to a cause of action for money damages." They based their
jurisdiction to hear Indian breach of trust suits on federal statutes granting federal courts
jurisdiction over certain classes of claims against the United States.' Further, the courts
found the requisite waiver of federal sovereign immunity in these jurisdictional statutes.'
The Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Mitchell I placed the validity of these decisions
in doubt. In Mitchell I, Indian owners of allotted forest land on the Quinault Reservation
sued the government for mismanagement of their timber under the theory that such
mismanagement. was a breach of trust.' The government held the lands in trust for the
Indians under an express trust created by the General Allotment Act. of 1887, 2 ' and
managed t he land pursuant to various statutes.' In a decision limited to the question of
whether the General Allotment Act authorized the award of money damages for misman-
agement of allotted forest land, 23 the Court ruled against the plaintiffs, reversing the
lower court decision.' Rejecting the plaintiff's' argument that the required waiver of
" See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 407-16 (1980) (power to dispose of
Indian land as guardian); United States v. Kagaina, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding Major Crimes
Act as an exercise of Congressional guardianship power).
12 F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL. INDIAN LAW 219-20 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter cited as F.
'' United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (quoting United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 102, 109-10 (1935)).
" 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
'5 See Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (CI. Cl. 1977); Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct.. Cl. 1975); Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d
1364 (Ct. CI. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v.
United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See also Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United
States, 174 Ct. Cl. 983 (1966) (upholding court's jurisdiction to hear such claims under 28 U.S.C. §§
1491, 1505). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 110 - 53.
" See infra text accompanying notes 110-53.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 110-53.
19 See 28 U,S.C.§§ 1346(a)(2), 1491, 1505 (1982). These statutes grant federal courts jurisdiction
to hear claims against the United States founded upon federal statutes. See infra text accompanying
notes 61-81.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 148 -51.
'1 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980).
21 Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C.
	 34 (1982)).
" See 25 U.S.C. § 162a (Supp. 1 1983); 25 U.S.C. §§ 318a, 323-25, 349, 372, 406, 407, 413, 466
(1982).
22 Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 536.
14 Id. at 546.
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sovereign immunity was contained in one of the jurisdictional statutes involved," the
Court construed the Allotment Act. strictly," as required in cases in which a statute is
alleged to waive sovereign immunity." According to the Court, the Allotment Act. created
only a limited trust not extending to the management of allotted forest lands.'" The Court
held that the Act could not, therefore, give rise to a cause of action for mismanagement of
such lands.'9 The Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims to determine whether
the statutes authorizing the government to manage the land created such a cause of
action.'"
Fortunately for Indian plaintiffs, Mitchell I was not the last word on breach of trust
litigation. In its second decision in the United States v. Mitchell litigation (Mitchell II), 31 the
Court held the government liable in money damages for breaches of fiduciary duties.'
The Court held that these duties were imposed by various statutes authorizing federal
management of allotted timber." The Court rejected its holding in Mitchell I that the
jurisdictional statutes involved did not waive the governments immunity to suit."' It
therefore construed the timber management statutes liberally in view of the existence of a
general trust relationship bet ween the federal government. and Indians." Furthermore,
the Court announced that, as a general rule, the United States is presumed to be acting as
a trustee in its management of Indian property." The Court found that the statutes
involved created a trust relationship, thereby imposing fiduciary duties on the federal
government." Borrowing from the private law of trusts, the Court held that this trust.
implicitly provided the injured Indian beneficiary with the right to sue the government
for damages resulting from a breach of its fiduciary duties."
Mitchellll is a landmark decision in Indian law. For the first time, the Supreme Court.
has held that the federal-Indian trust relationship, long recognized as a source of federal
power to manage Indian property," also imposes fiduciary duties on the federal trustee,
breaches of which give rise to a cause of action for money damages. 4" The Court in
Mitchell 11 conclusively rejected the strict analysis it had employed in Mitchell I,41 and
distinguished that case on the narrow grounds that the General Allotment Act did not
authorize the management of allotted timber, while the statutes involved in Mitchell II
did." Given this reading of Mitchell I, that decision should prove no obstacle to Indian
" Id. at 540.
" Id. at 542.
2t Id. at 538.
" ld. at 542.
29 Id. at 546.
" Id. at 546 & 1).7.
" 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
." Id. at 226.
39 Id. at 224-25.
"Id. at 216.
as Id. at 225.
"
" Id. at 224-25.
" Id at 226.
99 See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (declaring that in its role as
guardian, Congress has "plenary" power to manage Indian property).
°° 463 U.S. at 224-26.
Id. at 216, 218-19.
42 Irl, at 224 (construing 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (1982) (authorizing the sale of Indian timber by
the Department of the Interior); 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1982) (authorizing regulations to implement the
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plaintiffs suing the government for mismanagement of their property. Rather than
basing their claim on statutes such as the Allotment. Act, declaring their property to be
held in trust by the government, plaintiffs should base their claim upon the specific
statute authorizing the federal management of the resource involved. Following Mitchell
II, the courts will generally find t he government. liable for proven breaches of fiduciary
duties in managing Indian land and resources."
This casenote will first discuss the sovereign immunity of the United Stales and the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in suits brought by Indians and Indian tribes against the
government,'" before turning to several important breach of trust cases decided by the
lower courts before Mitchell /. 45 Following a discussion of the decisions in Mitchell I and
Mitchell II , 4" the casenote will analyze those decisions in more detail, concluding that the
Court in Mitchell 11 was correct in holding that the United States is liable in money
damages for mismanagement of Indian property. 47
 Finally, the casenote will analyze the
implications of Mitchell II on future breach of trust cases."
1. SUING THE UNITED STATES
To sue the United States, plaintiffs must meet three requirements: they must file suit
in a court with subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case; they must establish that the
United States has consented to suit.; and they must state a cause of action upon which the
requested relief may be granted." Although the Supreme Court has often distinguished
between these requirements,' it has sometimes confused them, 5 ' as it did in Mitchell 1. 5 "
To understand these requirements as they relate to the Mitchell litigation, this section of
t.he casenote will discuss the government's sovereign immunity and the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear claims against the government, culminating with a discussion of an
important Supreme Court decision directly leading to the Mitchell litigation.
A. The Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act
It is a well established principle that the United States, as a sovereign, cannot be sued
without its consent." Before 1855, claimants against the government were forced to seek
harvesting of Indian thither on a sustained-yield basis); 25 U.S.C. § 318(a) (1982) (road building on
Indian lands); 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-325 (1982) (grants of rights-of-way over Indian lands)).
at 225.
" See infra text accompanying notes 49-109.
45 See infra text accompanying notes 110-55.
'"' See infra text accompanying notes 156-336.
" See infra text accompanying notes 337-400.
48 See infra text accompanying notes 401-14.
4" Mitchell 1!, 463 U.S. at 212, 216; Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 538; Newton. Enforcing the Federal-
Indian Trust Relationship Afier Mitchell, 31 CAT0. U.L. REV. 635, 639 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Newton].
s') See, e.g., Mitche1111 , 963 U.S. at 216 (distinguishing between waiver of sovereign immunity and
a cause of action); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647. 649 (1963) (distinguishing between subject
matter jurisdiction and a cause of action).
Sr See, e.g., Travis & Adams, The Supreme Court's Shell Game: The Confusion of Jurisdiction and
Substantive Rights in Section 1983 Litigation, 24 B.C.L. REV. 635 (1983); Orme, Tucker Act jurisdiction
over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U. I.. REV. 855, 875-80 (confusion of all three requirements in
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Orme].
" See infra text accompanying notes 244 -45 & 380-84.
" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 212;	 , 445 U.S. at 538; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586 (1991); 14 C. WRicirr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654
(1976).
May 1985]
  	
CASENOTES	 813
redress from Congress." In that year, to relieve itself' of the burden of deciding such
claims, and to ensure their equitable adjudication, Congress established the Court of
Claims.'" The original Court of Claims Act empowered that court to hear claims against
the United States based on any law of Congress, any regulation of an executive depart-
ment, and any contract with t he federal government. 5 ' judgments of the court were not
final; rather, the court transmitted to Congress its findings and the record of the tes-
timony, along with  an opinion and a draft bill to implement the opinion." The draft hill
was referred to the Committee on Claims, where decisions for the claimant often lan-
guished without review or were rejected outright. 58 Thus, the court as originally consti-
tuted was flawed in two ways. First, it did not alleviate Congress's burden in deciding such
claims, as Congress itself had ultimate review of the court's decisions, and second,
claimants had to convince both the court. and Congress of the merits of their claims. These
flaws were corrected by the Act of March 3, 186 3, s5 which made the court's decisions final
and appealable to the Supreme Court."
In 1 88 7, Congress revised the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by passing the
Tucker Act.' With two notable except.ions," discussed later in the casenote, 63 the Su-
preme Court has consistently construed the Tucker Act as waiving the government's
sovereign immunity to the classes of claims described in the Act." The Act remains the
basic jurisdictional grant of the Court of Claims," 5
 and has been changed very little since
its enactment. The Tucker Act vests the Court-of Claims with jurisdiction to hear claims
for money damages against the United States founded upon federal statutes or regula-
" W. COWEN, I', NICHOLS, JR. & M. BENNET, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS - A
HisToRy, Part 11, 9-15 (1978) Thereinafiter cited as W. CowEN].
as Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
SO hi .
" Id. § 7, 10 Stitt. at 613.
se W. COWEN, supra. note 54, at 18.
" Ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863).
Ch. 92, § 5, 12 Stat. at 766. Section 14 of the Act, however, provided that "no money shall be
paid out of the treasury for any claim passed upon by the court of claims till after an appropriation
therefor shall he estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury." Id., 12 Stat, at 768. In Gordon v.
United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864), the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the Court
of Claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that its opinion would be advisory in nature
rather than judicial and hence unconstitutional, since it depended upon the action of the Secretary of
the Treasury under section 14 for enforcement. See W .CowEN,supra note 54, at 24 & n.77. Congress
repealed section 14 of the Act by the Act of March 17, 1886, ch. 19, § 1, 14 Stat. 9.
" 1 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)).
62 Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 535; United States v. iestan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
" See infra text accompanying notes 82-105 & 240-61.
64 See, e.g., Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 212; Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273 (1957);
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1940); Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163,
166-67 (1894).
' The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. 97 - 161, 96 Stat. 25, merged the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into a new federal court of appeals, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Act also created a new article 1 trial forum, the
United States Claims Court, which inherited the trial jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Because the
Mitchell litigation arose in the Court of Claims prior to the enactment of P.L. 97 - 164, the casenote will
continue to discuss the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, although such claims would now be heard
by the Claims Court with appeal to the Court. of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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lions, the Constitution, or a contract with the government." Federal district courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of Tucker Act claims not exceeding 10,000."
Under an 1863 amendment to i he original Court. of Claims Act," the court's jurisdic-
tion did not extend to claims arising from treaties with Indian tribes." Although the
amendment expressly excluded only tribal claims based upon treaties, it was widely
accepted as a bar to all tribal suits against the government." Consequently, until the Act.
was amended in 1946, a tribe had to obtain passage of a special jurisdictional act from
Congress in order to sue the United States in the Court of Claims."
In 1946, Congress enacted 1 he Indian Claims Commission Act to eliminate the need
for tribes to obtain special jurisdictional acts to sue the government." The Act established
the Indian Claims Commission, and vested it with jurisdiction to hear tribal claims against.
the federal government accruing before August 13, 1946." The Court of Claims was
granted appellate jurisdiction over Indian Claims Commission cases.' Section 24 of the
'a The Tucker Act now reads, in pertinent part;
The United Stales Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982). Before passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, P.L. 97.164, 96 Stat. 25, Tucker Act claims brought in the district courts were reviewable by the
court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court was located. P.L. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat.
37-38 added 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), which vests the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals of Tucker Act cases brought in the district courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
" Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612.
" Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. In Eastern Extension Tel. Co. v. United States.
231 U.S. 326 (1913), the Court held that the Tucker Act's repealer clause, ch. 359, § 16, 24 Stat. 508
(1887) had not repealed this section.
" See, e.g., Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Blare the Court of Claims, 55 GEO.	 511, 511 n. I
(1966) ("no suit could he brought unless Congress passed special legislation giving the Court of
Claims jurisdiction.") [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson]. For an argument that the individual Indians
could have brought treaty claims before the court, and that Indian tribes could have brought any
claims other than treaty claims, see Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for Its Breach? The Sad Saga of
United States v. Mitchell, 26 SAN MEG() L. REV. 447, 461 n.108 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hughes].
7 ' See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738, granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to
decide any claims by the Sioux Nation against the United States "under any treaties, agreements, or
laws of Congress, or for the misappropriation of any of the funds or lands of said tribe or band or
bands thereof." See also Newton, supra note 49, which states: "Some of [the cases decided under
special jurisdictional acts] are gold mines of favorable language regarding the government's trust
responsibilities .... Nevertheless they are doubtful precedents, for the jurisdictional acts have been
regarded as creating claims in and of themselves in recent years." N. at 636 n.10. See generally
Wilkinson, supra note 65. For this reason, these cases will not he considered further in this casenote.
72 The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049.
' Ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. at 1050. The sections of this act that governed the Indian Claims
Commission were omitted in the 1982 United States Code. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-3 (1982)
(codification notes).
" Ch. 959, § 20, 60 Stat. at 1054. As in.the case of decisions under special jurisdictional acts,see
supra note 71, many Indian Claims Commission cases contain favorable language regarding the
government's trust responsibilities. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1956). These cases
are of questionable precedential value, however, as they have sometimes been regarded as exercises
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Act, sometimes called the "Indian Tucker Act," applied to post-1946 tribal claims." This
section was intended to give Indian tribes "the same right to sue in [the Court of Claims]
as is granted to others under the Tucker Act." T' As the Supreme Court had consistently
interpreted the Tucker Act as waiving the government's sovereign immunity," Congress
presumably intended the Indian Tucker Act to waive sovereign immunity as well. 78
Furthermore, the Court of Claims had construed the Indian Tucker Act as a waiver of
sovereign immunity, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell 1. 79 The language
and legislative history of section 24 indicate that Congress intended breach of trust claims
to be within the scope of jurisdiction granted by that section. Section 24 provided that the
section was not to be construed as altering the federal-lndian trust relationship. 8° Con-
gressman Jackson, House sponsor of the bill, stated: "The Interior Department itself has
suggested that it ought not to he in a position where its employees can mishandle funds
and lands of a national trusteeship without complete accountability." FIL
It has been noted that the Supreme Court had consistently construed the Tucker Act
as granting the government's consent to suit for those classes of claims described in the
Act. 82 In United States v. Testan, 83 however, the Court expressly rejected the argument that
the Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity regarding any claim described in the Act. m
of the Commission's jurisdiction to hear "claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity." The Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, § 2, 60
Stat. at 1050. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 1214 n.8; Newton, supra note 49, at 636-37 n.10.
Pre-1946 cases over which the Indian Claims Commission had original jurisdiction will not he
considered further in this casenote.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982) states:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the United
States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable
group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or
Alaska whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be
cognizable in the Claims Court if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.
7" Id. Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 489-90 (1966). See also
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 212 n.8: Mitchell!, 445 U.S. at 538-40; H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945).
" See ,e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1940); Schillinger v. United States, 155
U.S. 163, 166-67 (1894).
78
 Brief of Amici Curiae Shoshone Tribe, at 17 , Mitchell!!, 465 U.S. '206 (1983). See Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (when Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior
law, Congress is presumed to adopt prior judicial interpretations of the prior law in the new one).
See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. United States, 586 F.2d 192, 200 (CI Cl. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 944 (1979); id. at 208 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting).
Ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1055-56 (1946). This provision was omitted from 28 U.S.C. § 1505 in
the 1970 printing of the United States Code,
st 92 CONC. REC. 5312 (1946). In a similar fashion the House Committee Report stated: "If we
fail to meet these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds have been improperly
dissipated or other fiduciary duties have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the
United States." H.R. REP. No. 1466, supra note 76, at 5. As an example of the type of case for which
tribes needed access to the courts, the House Report cited Menominee Tribe v. United States, 117 Ct.
Cl. 442 (1950), a breach of trust case brought under a special jurisdictional act. In Menominee Tribe,
the plaintiffs obtained an award for federal mismanagement of Indian timber. H.R. REP. No. 1466,
.supra note 76, at 4.
82 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
n 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
84 Id. at 400.
816	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:809
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Tucker Act in 'lesion led to the government's
motion to dismiss the Mitchell litigation, and proved nearly fatal to the plaintiffs in Mitchell
I. Because of the effect of the Testan decision on the Mitchell litigation, the casenote will
discuss Testan before turning to a discussion of breach of trust suits decided before
Mitchell I.
B. The Decision in United States v. Testan
In United States v. Testan, two government attorneys claimed that they should have
been classified at a higher position with a higher salary. 85 After exhausting their adminis-
trative remedies, the attorneys brought suit in the Court of Claims under the Classifica-
tion Act" for reclassification to the higher position and an award of back pay. 87 The Court
of Claims remanded the case to the Civil Service Commission for a determination of
whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the position."" The court held that if the Commis-
sion found that the plaintiff's were entitled to the position, that finding would create a
legal right to money damages. 89
Holding that the claims were not within the jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act,
the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of Claims decision. 9° Noting that
Tucker Act jurisdiction is limited to claims against the government for money damages,'"
the Court stated that the Tucker Act is only a jurisdictional statute which does not create
any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.'° Accord-
ing to the Court, the Court. of Claims had recognized that the Act merely conferred
jurisdiction on that court whenever a substantive right exists." Therefore, the issue in
Testan, the Court stated, was whether the Classification Act conferred a substantive right
to money damages for wrongful civil service classifications."
The Court began its analysis of the Classification Act issue by observing that the
United States is immune from suit unless it has consented to he sued," and that such
consent must be unequivocally expressed. 96
 Applying these principles to the Classification
Act, the Court found no provision in the Act that expressly made the United States liable
for pay lost through allegedly improper classificat ions," The Court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the Tucker Act waived the governments' sovereign immunity to suits based
upon a federal statute because the Classification Act did not explicitly confer a substantive
right."
Restating the propositions that the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional and that the
grant of a cause of action must be made with specificity, the Court reasoned that "the
asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute 'can
84
 Id. at 393-94.
86 5 U.S.C. §.§ 5101-5115 (1982).
87
 499 F.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 4'24 U.S. 392 (1976).
" Id. at 692.
" Id. at 691.
" 424 U.S. at 392.
91
 Id. at 397-98. Justice Blackmun authored the Court's opinion. Id. at 392.
92 Id, at 398.
93 Id. (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. united States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007-09 (Ct.. Cl. 1967)).
" Id. at 398.
"' Id. at 392.
" Id. at 399.
97 Id.
Id. at 400.
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fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damages sustained,' ' 99 The Court held that the Classification Act could not be inter-
preted this way.'" According to the Court, nothing in either the Classification Act or its
legislative history suggested that Congress intended to change the "established rule" that .
one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until appointed to it."' Furthermore, the
Court stated, the plaintiffs did not have a right without a remedy as the Classification Act
provided an administrative avenue of prospective relief.'" Because the Classification Act
did not create a substantive right to back pay,'" the Court concluded that the claim was
not within the Tucker Act jurisdiction of the Court of Claims'" and ordered the suit
dismissed. 1"5
When.the Supreme Court decided Testan in 1976, the Mitchell litigation, which had
been filed in 1971, was already well underway. The Court of Claims had decided three
preliminary issues in the case,'" and there had been extensive discovery."' The govern-
ment had not contested the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case, which was brought
by the individual plaintiffs under the Tucker Act and by the tribal plaintiff under the
Indian Tucker Act. Following the Supreme Court's new interpretation of the Tucker Act
(and possibly, by analogy, the Indian Tucker Act) in Testan as granting the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to hear a case only when another statute waives the government's
sovereign immunity, the government moved to dismiss Mitchell 1 and other breach of
federal-lndian trust suits ]°" on jurisdictional grounds.'" Before turning to Mitchell I,
however, the casenote will discuss the major breach of trust suits decided prior to the
Court's interpretation of the Tucker Act in Testan.
II. ENFORCING THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP BEFORE MITCHELL
In several cases decided prior to Mitchell 1, lower courts exercising Tucker Act and
Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction awarded money damages to Indian plaintiffs for federal
" Id. (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
1" Id. at 402.
101
" Id. at 403. The Court also rioted that plaintiffs had a second possible avenue of prospective
relief by way of mandainus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). Id. The Testan plaintiffs had initiated
such an action. Id. at 401 n.5.
' la The Court also rejected the argument that the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1982), created
such a right. That act was held to apply only to wrongful reductions in pay. Testan, 424 U.S. at
405-07.
1 " 424 U.S. at 404.
1" Id. at 407-08.
1 °6 In Capoeman v. United States, 440 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (en bane), the court held
that the statute of limitations barred a claim of one of the individual plaintiffs. In Quinault Allottees
Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1276 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (en bane), the court held that the allottees
met the requirements to maintain a class action under its rules. Finally, in Quinault Allottees Ass'n v.
United Stales, 485 F.2d 1391, 1401 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974), the court
held that the United States was entitled to deduct a reasonable management fee from the sale of the
allotted timber.
1 07 Brief for Respondents at 8, Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
100
	 v. United States, 674 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d
1332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
= 0 The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was timely although brought late
in the proceedings, because such a motion may be raised any time prior to a decision on the merits.
Mitchell!, 591 F.2d 1300, 1301 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (construing GT. Ct. R. 38(h)). See also J. MOORE & J.
LUCAS, 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE: 4.02[3] (2d ed. 1985) ("[T]he notion that lack of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction may he raised so long as the case is pending ... is firmly established.").
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government breaches of fiduciary duties."° These courts readily accepted the general
existence of a federal-Indian trust relationship."' Construing federal statutes" 2 liberally
in favor of the Indians in view of this relationship and borrowing from the common law of
private trusts, these courts imposed common-law fiduciary duties on the federal govern-
ment in excess of express statutory duties." 3
 Furthermore, until the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Testan,'" the government failed to mount a successful challenge
to the courts' jurisdiction to hear such cases. 1 i 3
In Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, employing an analysis that became
a model for later decisions, a federal district court held the government liable for
mismanagement of tribal trust funds." 8
 The statutes governing trust funds authorized
the government to invest those funds in treasury accounts bearing four percent inter-
est,'" or in other investments."" Construing these statutes liberally to the benefit of the
Indians in view of the "solemn trust obligation" of the United States to the Indian
trihes,"8
 the court determined that they required a minimum rate of return of four
percent on tribal trust funds, and authorized higher-yielding investments.'" Next, rea-
soning that the conduct of the government as a trustee was measured by the same
standards applicable to private trustees,"' the court held the government liable for breach
of its duty to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive. 122 Th e
court held that the government breached this duty when it deposited funds in the four
percent treasury account when other higher-yielding investments were available.'" The
Court of Claims followed Manchester Band two years later in an opinion directing the trial
judge to apply the common law of private trusts in measuring the government's liabil-
ity. 124
"° See Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d
1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972), ret/d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v.
United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Indians were also successful in obtaining
declaratory and injunctive relief for breach of the federal trust. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 515
F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
Equitable enforcement of the trust relationship is beyond the scope of this casenote. For a detailed
discussion, see generally Chambers, supra note 5.
"' See Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d at 652; Cheyenne -Arapaho, 512 F.2d at 1392; Mason, 461
F.2d at 1372-73; Manchester Band, 363 F. Supp. at 1243.
"2 25 U.S.C. §§ 161a, 162a, 323, 465 (1982), Osage Allotment Act of 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539
(often amended).
1 " See Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d at 653; Cheyenne-Arapaho, 512 F.2d at 1394; Mason, 461
F.2d at 1372; Manchester Band, 363 F. Supp. at 1245.
"4
 424 U.S. 392 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 82-109.
"5 See infra text accompanying notes 142-51.
"6 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
1 " 25 U.S.C. § 161a (Supp. I 1983).
25 U.S.C. § 162a (1982) (federally insured bank accounts, federal bonds and federally
insured bonds).
1 " Manchester Band, 363 F. Supp. at 1245. As a general rule, statutes enacted to benefit Indians
are liberally construed in favor of the Indians and doubtful expressions are resolved in the Indians'
favor. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 690 (1979); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
10
 Manchester Band, 363 F. Supp. at 1244.
"` Id. at 1245 (citing United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973)).
122 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959)).
I" Id. at 1247.
124
 Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. CI. 1975). The Court of
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The Court of Claims again employed the Manchester Band analysis in Coast Indian
Community v. United States, in which it held the government liable for breach of trust in
granting a right-of-way worth $57,000 over Indian land for only $2,500) 25
 The court
premised the government's fiduciary duties on the trust status of the land' 2" and a statute
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to convey rights-of-way over Indian lands) 27
Construing these statutes "in light of ... the government's role as a fiduciary regarding
Indian property," 128
 and applying common-law standards applicable to private trustees,'
the court held the government liable for gross negligence in under-appraising the value
of the right-of-way.'"
One breach of trust suit decided prior to Mitchell I reached the Supreme Court. In
Mason v. United Slates, administrators of an Osage Indian's estate held in trust under the
Osage Allotment Act ' 3 ' sued the United States for breach of its fiduciary duty in paying a
state tax on the estate, 132 The government had paid the tax based on West v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, a 1948 Supreme Court opinion upholding the tax as applied to Osage trust
property) 33
 The Court of Claims agreed with the plaintiffs that the West decision had
been seriously eroded by subsequent Supreme Court opinions' and was no longer
controlling.' 35
 Applying the common law of private trusts in measuring the government's
fiduciary duties, 13" the court held the government liable for breach of its fiduciary duties
in failing to seek a reconsideration of West. 'The Supreme Court reversed. us
 Declaring
that West had not been "substantially weakened" by subsequent opinions,°" the Court
held that "the United States reliance on West was reasonable in this situation."'" Sig-
nificantly, while the plaintiffs in Mason lost on the merits, the Supreme Court applied
Claims has held, however, that interest cannot be awarded on an accounting claim brought by an
Indian tribe against the government absent a contract, treaty or statute authorizing the payment of
interest. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309, 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 911 (1976). See Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 994-95 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(discussing Mescalero Apache and Cheyenne-Arapaho). The Court of Claims has also held that the
United States cannot he held liable for failure to reinvest the interest. accrued on tribal trust funds in
interest bearing accounts. Navajo Tribe, 624 F.2d at 995; Mescalero Apache, 518 F.2d at 1331.
'" 550 F.2d 639, 654 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
1211 The land was held in trust under 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1982). Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d at
652.
127 25 U.S.C. § 323 (1982).
'" Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d at 652.
'2' Id. at 653 & n.43 (citing 2 A. Scot-r, TRUSTS §§ 174, 176 (3d ed. 1967)).
Cocci Indian Community, 550 F.2d at 653-54. Curiously, the court never referred to a provision
in Title 25 providing: "No grant of a right-of-way shall be made without the payment of such
compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just.
-
 25 U.S.C. § 325 (1982).
33 ' Ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) (often amended).
1 " Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1366 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd , 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
'":' 334 U.S. 717 (1948).
134 Mason, 461 F.2d at 1369-72.
1 ' Id. at 1374-78.
"'s Id, at 1372-73 & n.9 (citing various sections of C. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (2c1 ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as C. BOGERT & C. Boot:R.11 and 4 A. SCOTT, supra
note 7).
'3' Mason, 461 F.2d at 1372-74.
'a" Mason v. United States, 412 U.S. 391, 392 (1973).
130 Id. at 395 -96.
'w Id. at 400.
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common-law fiduciary principles in determining the government's fiduciary duties to
Indians.'"
Although many pre-Mitchell I decisions failed to address the jurisdiction of the court
to hear breach of trust claims against the government,"2 the Court of Claims stated that it
had jurisdiction to hear such claims in two cases.'" In Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United
States, the plaintiffs brought a claim for money damages and a claim for a general
accounti ng. "4 The court granted a motion by the government to dismiss the accounting
claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act to compel an
accounting, which is an equitable action.'" Noting that its jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act did not include equitable actions,'" the Court reasoned that the Indian Tucker Act.
merely gives Indian tribes the same rights to sue in the Court. of Claims as are granted to
individuals under the Tucker Act, 147 The court went on to slate, however, that it did have
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and the I ndian Tucker Act to award money damages
for government mismanagement of Indian funds and property. 14"
The government contested both the jurisdiction of the court and the consent of the
government to be sued in the Court of Claims decision in Mason.'" The court rejected
both arguments, reasoning that the claim was wit hin its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.,
as it was a claim for money damages founded upon a federal statute. 15a The government
did not raise the jurisdiction or sovereign immunity issues before the Supreme Court, and
the Court merely stated in a footnote that jurisdiction was based on the Tucker Act.' 51
The Klamath-Manchester Band-Mason line of cases evinced a judicial inclination to view
the federal-Indian trust relationship as a legally enforceable private trust.' 55 In the few
instances in which the government asserted lack of jurisdiction or sovereign immunity as a
defense to Indian breach of fiduciary duty actions, the courts easily found the requisite
Id. at 398.
' 42 See, e.g., Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Manchester Band of Porno Indians v.
United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973). In Manchester Band, the court considered the
limited question of whether the district court's concurrent. Tucker Act jurisdict ion under 28 §
1346(a)(2) included tribal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1505. The court held that it did. Manchester Band,
363 F. Supp. at 1242.
1" Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rend on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391
(1973); Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483 (1966).
144 174 Ct. Cl. at 485.
145 Id. at 490.
"" Id. at 487-88.
"7 Id. at 489-90.
' 4 " Id. at 491.
'1 461 F.2d at 1374; Brief for the United States, joint Appendix at 8, United States v. Mason,
412 U.S. 391 (1973) (reprinting United States' Answer to Petition, Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d
1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972)).
154' Mason, 461 F.2d at 1374.
L" 412 U.S. at 394 n.5.
"' A 1975 study of equitable endorsement of the trust relationship concludes: "It is premature
. to announce the existence of a cause of action for breach of trust . . . The trend, however, seems
to he a sound one ...." Chambers, supra note 5, at 1247. (The author, then Assistant Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior, was writing in his private capacity.) In 1978, the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior concluded; "There is a legally enforceable trust obligation owed by the
United States Government to American Indian tribes." Letter of Krulitz, Solicitor, supra note 4, at 2a.
The Solicitor further concluded that the government's fiduciary duties toward Indians were to he
measured by the common law of private trusts. Id. at 14a.
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jurisdictional grant and waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act or the Indian
Tucker Act. 15'1
 The Supreme Court's analysis of the Tucker Act in a non-Indian setting in
United Slates v. Testan,E 54
 and the Court's subsequent. application of Testan to an Indian
breach of trust suit in Mitchell 1, however, cast doubt on the validity of these decisions.
Testan set up jurisdictional and sovereign immunity roadblocks to Tucker Act suits' 55
which proved nearly fatal to the plaintiffs' case in Mitchell I. In the following section, the
case note will discuss t he decision in Mitchell I and its implications for Indian trust cases.
MITCHELL
In Mitchell], individual allot tees of the Quinault Indian Reservation and the Quinault
Tribe sued the United States for mismanagement of allotted forest land the government.
expressly held "in trust" under t he General Allotment. Act.' 56 The Court of Claims denied
the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,'" concluding that "the
congressional declaration of trust in the General Allotment Act 'can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained'
because of a proven breach of trust." 15" The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
General Allotment Act created only a limited trust relationship between the United States
and the allottee that did not impose any duty upon the government to manage timber
resources. 159
 The Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims for a consideration of
other grounds of liability argued by the plaintiffs but not reached by the Court of
Claims."'
A. Historical Background of the Mitchell Litigation
In the 1850's, the United States sought to remove Indian tribes from large areas of
the Pacific Northwest to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. 1 " 1
 Under this policy, the
United States entered into the Treaty of Olympia with the Quinault and Quileute
tribes." The United States Senate ratified the treaty in 1859.'" 3
 Under the treaty, the
tribes surrendered a vast tract of land in exchange for the government's promise to set
aside a reservation for the Indians.'" In fulfillment of this promise, President Grant set
153 See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
1 " 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
'" See .supra notes 82 - 109 and accompanying text.
'5'i
	 of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 -34, 339, 342, 348, 349,
354, 381 (1982).
' 57
 Mitchell I, 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979), reo'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
1" Id. at 1302 (quoting Testae, 424 U.S. at 400, 402 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States,
372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
l'g 445 U.S. at 543.
"° Id. at 546 & n.7. The other grounds of liability presented by plaintiffs included the assertions
that other statutes render the United States liable in money damages for timber mismanagement,
that the claim was one for money improperly exacted or retained, that the special federal-Indian
relationship makes the government liable for such mismanagement, and that the claims were
cognizable under the Tucker Act as contract claims. Id. at 546 n.7.
1 " Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 207.
'" Treaty of Olympia, Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971.
'"
164 Id.
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aside approximately 220,000 acres of forest land to be held for the use of Quinault,
Quileute, and other northwestern tribes.'" The land set aside, known as the Quinault
Reservation, was heavily forested.'" Only two percent of the land was suitable for
agriculture or for homesites."7
In 1905, Congress began to allot land on the Quinault Reservation to individual
Indians pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887.'" 8 The purpose of the Act was to
break up tribal landholdings and to give each individual Indian his own plot of land."`"
The "friends of the Indian" believed that private ownership of land would serve to
"substitute white civilization for [Indian] culture."'" They also believed that. private
ownership secured by a federal patent would be more secure than tribal possession.'" In
addition, the allotment of Indian land, it was thought, would end the dependency of
Indians on the government, saving the government a great expense.'" Finally, allotment
was aimed at opening up "surplus" Indian lands to white settlement.''
The General Allotment Act provided for the allotment of tribal land to individual
Indians ' 74 and authorized the President to grant such allotments whenever reservation
land was found suitable for agricultural or grazing purposes. 175 Allotments were not to
exceed eighty acres of :agricultural land or 160 acres of' grazing land.'m The Act did not
refer to forest land.'" Section 5 of the Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to issue
patents declaring that the United States would hold the allotted land "in trust for the sole
use and benefit of the Indian" allottee for a period of twenty-five ,years.' 78 At the end of
the trust period, the allottee was to receive full fee simple title to the allotment. 179
Congress has since extended the trust period indefinitely.'"
By 1911, the government had issued over 750 allotments on the Quinault Reserva-
tion, most of them to Indians who were not members of the signatory tribes to the Treaty
of Olympia.'"' In that year, Congress passed legislation to clarify the President's authority
i"5 Executive Order of Nov. 4, 1873, 1 C. KAPFLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS 923 (2d. ed. 1904).
1 "" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 208.
Quinault Allottees Ass'ri v. United States, 485 F.2d 1391, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1973),re-rt. denied, 416
U.S. 961 0974).
o"s Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 208; Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-34, 339, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1982).
" History of the Allotment Policy, hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, 428-89 (1934) (statement of D. Otis), reprinted in D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT
& C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL. INDIAN LAW 69 (1979).
170 id.
' 7 ' Id. at 70.
1 " Id.
' 73 Id. at 71.
'" 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
17' Id.
' 76 Id.
1" Quinault Allottees Ass'n, 485 F.2d at 1394.
'" 24 Stat. 389, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
'79 Id.
LW
 Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 316, 325, authorized the President to extend the trust
period indefinitely. The President has exercised this authority several times. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)
(Extension of Trust Periods). Congress indefinitely extended and continued the trust period through
the Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 462
(1982).
"' Quinault Allottees Ass'n, 485 F.2d at 1394.
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to issue allotments on the Quinault Reservation to hose Indians.'" In 1912, the Depart-
ment of the Interior discontinued allotting Quinault Reservation land because the land
was more valuable for its timber than for agricultural or grazing purposes, 183 The
Department maintained that. only agricultural or grazing land could be allotted.'" Subse-
quent to the Supreme Court's 1924 decision in United States v. Payne,'"' in which the Court
held that although the Allotment Act referred only to grazing and agricultural land, it did
not preclude the allotment of forest land on the Quinault Reservation, the Department
resumed allotment of Quinault Reservation land.'" By 1935, the entire reservation had
been divided into 2,340 trust allotments, most of which were eighty acres of dense
forest. 187 About two-thirds of this land is still in trust status, the remainder having passed
to non-Indians by inheritance or sale.'" A small portion of land on the reservation is
currently held in trust for the Quinault Tribe.'"
The heavily-forested lands of the Quinault Reservation did not lit well into the
General Allotment Act scheme, which contemplated that the allottee would use the land
for agriculture or grazing.'"" Although such lands could be allotted,'"' t he allottee could
not cut the timber for sale because it was a part of the realty subject to the trust.'" The
only federal statute authorizing the sale of Indian timber expressly forbade the sale of live
timber.'" Consequently, allot ments of forest land were of little value to the allottees. To
remedy this situation, the Department of the Interior requested Congress to enact
legislation authorizing the sale of allotted timber. 19' In response to the request, Congress
Quinault Allotment Act, ch. 246, 36 Stat. 1345 (1911). This act was construed in Halbert v.
United States, 283 U.S. 753 (1931), in which the Court held that personal residence on the reserva-
tion was not a prerequisite to the issuance of an allotment. Id. at 762.
Quinault Allottees Ass'n, 485 F.2d at 1395.
'" Id. The Act referred to agricultural or grazing land, but riot to Forest land. See supra notes
176 -77 and accompanying text.
'm 264 U.S. 446 (1924).
1 " Id. at 449.
197 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 209.
198 Brief for Respondents at 4, Mitchell II, 463 ,U.S. 206 (1983).
1"9 Id. at 4 n.5.
"K" See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
151 United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924). See supra text accompanying notes 185 - 86.
' 92 Starr v. Campbell, 208 U.S. 527, 534 (1908) (allotment; on Chippewa Reservation). CI.
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956) (holding income from the sale of allotted timber on the
Quinault Reservation exempt from federal income tax due to the trust status of the timber under the
General Allotment Act); United States v. Eastman, 118 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 635
(1941) (upholding federal regulation of timber on Quinault allotments). The Eastman court stated:
"Since the [Quinault allotments] are chiefly valuable for their timber it is settled law that the restraint
upon alienation, effected by the trust of the trust patents, extends to the timber as well as to the
land." Id. at 424 (citing Starr, 208 U.S. 527). In Starr, the Court distinguished its decision in United
States v. Paine Lumber Co., 206 U.S. 467 (1907), in which the Court had held that allottees could sell
timber on their land. Id. at 472-74. The Starr Court limited the holding of Paine Lumber to allowing
the sale of timber cleared for the purpose of cultivation, 208 U.S. at 534, although Paine Lumber had
held explicitly that the allottee could sell timber cleared for any purpose, including sale. 206 U.S. at
473-74.
193 Act of Feb. 16, 1889, ch. 172, 25 Stat. 673; H.R. RF.P. No. 2135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910)
(reprinting letter of the Secretary of the Interior citing this statute as the only general law authorizing
the sale of Indian timber). See also 45 CONC.. REC. 6086 (1910).
"s H.R. REP. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (letter of the Secretary of the Interior).
The Secretary's letter stated:
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passed the Act of June 25, 1910." The 1910 Act authorized the commercial sale of
standing timber on allotted lands, subject to the consent of the Secretary of the Interior,
with proceeds paid to the allottees or used for their benefit by the Interior Department.'"
The Act also provided for the sale of unallotted timber by the Interior Department, with
proceeds to be used for the benefit of the tribe.' 97
Although the 1910 Act speaks only in terms of thesale of allotted timber, the Interior
Department interpreted the Act as imposing broad management responsibilities "to
obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and
improvement of the forests."'" In 1934, Congress expressly directed that the Interior
Department manage Indian timber resources including, presumably, allotted timber "on
the principle of sustained-yield management."' Congress amended the 1910 Act in 1964
to direct the Interior Department., in dealing with allotted timber, to consider "the needs
and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs."'" The regulations of the Interior
Department regarding Indian timber are designed to assure that the Indians receive "the
benefit of whatever ... profit [the forest] is capable of yielding.'°0 1
Under the 1910 Act and regulations implementing the Act., the responsibilities of the
federal government in managing Indian timber are "comprehensive." 202 The Interior
Department "'exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and management
of tribal timber.'  "3
 Conversely, the allottees exercise almost no control over timber
management; the Indians have nothing to do with the entire operation, except signing
the initial power of attorney, and opening the envelope containing a check five or ten
years later. V1" The Interior Department also exercises comprehensive control over grants
of rights-of-way and road construction on Indian lands held in trust.'" The Department
may grant rights-of-way across trust land for any purpose, 2" provided that it obtains the
consent of the tribal or individual owner' and that the Indian owners receive just
It is believed by' this department that there should be a general law applicable to all
Indian lands, because in many instances the timber is the only valuable part of the
allotment or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the support of the
Indian or the improvement of his allotment.
Id.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 36 Stat. 855 [hereinafter cited as the 1910 Act].
'-9
€ Ch. 431, § 8, 36 Stat. 857, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 406 (1982).
1 " Ch, 431, § 7, 36 Stat. 857, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
' 94
 Mitchell //, 463 U.S. at 220 (quoting OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REGULATIONS AND INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF FORESTS ON INDIAN  RESERVATION 4 (1911) [hereinafter cited as
1911 REctiLATioNs]).
'" Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 6, 48 Stat. 984, 986, 25 U.S.C. 466 (1982).
z""
	 Of April 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186, 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982).
"' 25 C.F.R. § 163.3(d) (1985).
202 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 209 (quoting White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145
( I 980)).
203 M. (quoting White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 147).
214
 Brief for Respondents at 5, Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
205
 Act of Feb. 5, 1948, 62 Stat. 17, ch. 45, 25 U.S.C. §§ 323.325 (1982) (rights-of-way); Act of'
May 26, 1928, 45 Stat. 750, ch. 756, 25 U.S.C. § 318 (1982) (road building). The Interior Department
has adopted detailed regulations concerning rights-of-way over Indian lands. See C.F.R. Part 169
(1985).
206
 25 U.S.C. § 323 (1982).
"7 Under certain circumstances the consent of the individual land-owner is not needed. 25
U.S.C. § 324 (1982).
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compensation.'" In 1920, the government began managing sales of' allotted and tribal
timber on the Quinault Reservation." 9 The government has entered into fourteen long-
term, large-volume contracts covering many allotments. 2 "0 Since that date one of these
contracts was ongoing, and one was completed, during the Mitchell litigation.'"
In short, allotted and tribal lands on the Quinault Reservation are expressly held in
trust for the allottees and for the tribe by the federal government."' The government
exercises comprehensive management of the land through statutes authorizing federal
management of Indian timber and rights-of-way and road building over Indian lands. 213
The benefited Indians themselves have little to do with the management of the land. 2 "
B. Origins of the Mitchell Litigation
The Mitchell litigation began in 1971 when Quinault Reservation allottees, the
Quinault Tribe, 215 and the Quinault Allottees Association"' filed suit against the United
States in the Court of Claims seeking money damages for federal mismanagement of
allotted lands. 2 ' 7 The plaintiffs claimed that the government breached fiduciary duties
imposed by the General Allotment Act and other statutes in mismanaging allotted forest
land.''" Specifically, the plaintiff's raised five major claims. First, they claimed that the
government failed to obtain fair market value for the timber."' Second, the plaintiffs
claimed that the government failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis. 22" Third,
they claimed that the government failed to build roads necessary for proper timber
management.'' ] Further, they asserted that the government paid no interest or in-
sufficient interest on Indian funds held by the government.''' Finally, they asserted that
the government exacted excessive timber management fees and improper road manage-
ment fees from the allottees.'"'
The plaintiffs based jurisdiction on the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act. From
the filing of the suit in 1971 to 1977, the Court of Claims decided three preliminary
issues"' and conducted the first. phase of trial on the merits"' without any challenge by
2"" 25 U.S.C. § 325 (1982).
2" Brief for Respondents at 4, Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
21" Id. at 4-5.
2" Id. at 5.
' 12 See supra text accompanying notes 178-80, 189.
.213
	 supra text. accompanying notes 194 - 210.
214 See .supra text accompanying note 204.
215 The Quinault Tribe now holds some portion of the allotted lands. Brief for Respondents at 2
n.2, Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
21" The Quinault Allottees Association is an unincorporated association dedicated to protecting
and promoting the interests of Quinault Reservation allottees. Mitchell!, 591 F.2d 1300, 1300 n.2 (Ct.
Cl. 1979).
2 " Id. at 1300.
21' Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210-11. The principal statutes were: 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (1982)
(timber sales); 25 U.S.C. § 466 (promulgation of regulations requiring sustained-yield management);
25 U.S.C. § 318a (1982) (road building); and 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-325 (1982) (rights-of-way). For a
discussion of these statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 194 -208.
215 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210.
7211 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
72.1 Id.
22-I See supra note 106.
222 Brief for Respondents at 8, Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
826	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:809
the government to the Court's jurisdiction to decide the case. In 1977, however, shortly
after the Supreme Court's new interpretation of the Tucker Act in Testan, the govern-
ment moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."'
C. The Court of Claims Decision
The Court of Claims, sitting en banc, unanimously denied the government's motion
to dismiss 227 holding that it had jurisdiction of the plaintiff's breach of trust claims under
the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act.'" First, the court noted that the General
Allotment Act expressly declares that the United States holds allotted land "in trust for
the sole use and benefit" of the allottee. 229 Reading the words of the Allotment Act plainly
and in light of the administration of the Act by the Interior Department, the court viewed
the Act as imposing duties upon the government to manage and conserve the trust
property. 23" Next, the court held that the General Allotment Act gives rise to a cause of
action for money damages since it "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation
by the Federal Government for the damage sustained' "231 as required by Testan. 232 The
court reasoned that the trust language in the statute implied the right to sue for damages
for breach of trust:233 especially in view of the inadequacy of prospective equitable
relief." 3a The court rioted that it had consistently upheld its jurisdiction in breach of trust.
suits"' and that Congress, in enacting the Indian Tucker Act, believed that Indian trust
legislation such as the General Allotment Act gave rise to a cause of action for money
damages for breach of trust."'
Having found a right to sue for money damages in the General Allotment Act, the
court found it unnecessary to decide whether other federal statutes invoked by the
=" Mitchell I, 591 F.2d 1300, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1979), rev'd, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). The motion was
timely although brought after a partial trial on the merits because lack of subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised any time prior to a decision on the merits. Id. at 1301 ri.6.
117 M. at 1301. Judge Nichols wrote a concurring opinion, but joined in the court's opinion
except as noted. 591 F.2d at 1306 (Nichols, J., concurring). See infra note 234 for a discussion of
Judge Nichols' opinion.
2" Id. at 1303. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982) grants the court jurisdiction to
hear claims against the United States "founded , , . upon ... any Act of Congress ...." The Indian
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982), grants the court jurisdiction to hear tribal claims against the
United States "arising under the laws . . . of the United States ... ."
229 591 F.2d at 1302 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)).
.2"'" Id, at 1302 n.11. The court expressly rejected the government's argument that the sole
function of the General Allotment Act trust is to prevent improvident alienation of the allotment by
the allottee. Id.
"' Id. at 1302 (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400, 402 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States,
372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
232 924 U.S. 392 (1976).
293
	 1, 591 F.2d at 1302-03.
"' Id. at 1302-03 & n.13. In a separate opinion, Judge Nichols stated that the lack of another
remedy should riot be a factor in deciding whether the United States has consented to be sued. Id. at
1307-08 (Nichols, J., concurring).
235 Id, at 1303 (citing Mason, 461 F.2d at 1374; Klamath, 174 Ct. CI. at 491-92). See supra text
accompanying notes 142-51. The opinion also noted that it had referred to its jurisdiction to hear
such claims in other breach of trust suits. See 591 F.2d at 1303.
"" 591 F.2d at 1304. The court noted that the views of the 1946 Congress which enacted the
Indian Tucker Act are not definitive as to the scope of the General Allotment Act of 1887, but found
it "helpful to have the explicit and authoritative understanding of the 1946 Congress which went
deeply into the problem of redressing wrongs against Indians and provided judicial and quasi-
judicial remedies." Id. at 1304 n.17.
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plaintiffs created a similar right. 227 The court stated, however, that it would take account
of those statutes in determining the liability of the government for breach of trust created
by the General Allotment Act. 235 The government petitioned for writ of certiorari, which
the Supreme Court granted.'"
D. The Supreme Court Decision
Reviewing the decision that the United States was liable in money damages for
mismanagement of allotted timber under the General Allotment Act, the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Claims by a vote of 5-3, in an opinion written by Justice Marshal1. 240
The Court held that the General Allotment Act created only a limited trust relationship
between the United States and the allottee not extending to the management of timber
resources."' According to the Court, the Act could not, therefore, give rise to a cause of
action for federal mismanagement of allotted timber."' The Court remanded the case to
the Court of Claims to consider whether the timber statutes give rise to such a cause of
action, an issue that court had not reached. 245
The Court's opinion began by restating the principles announced in Testan:
The Tucker Act is "only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substan-
tive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." ...The
Act merely "confers jurisdiction upon (the Court of Claims) whenever the
substantive right exists." . . . The individual claimants, therefore, must look
beyond the jurisdictional statute for a waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to their claims.'"
The Court rejected the Indians's argument that the Indian Tucker Act contained the
consent to suit lacking in the Tucker Act, reasoning that Congress intended the Indian
Tucker Act to give tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided to
individuals by the Tucker Act. 245
Turning to an analysis of the General Allotment Act, the Court construed the Act
strictly as a waiver of sovereign immunity and found that "[t]he Act does not unambigu-
ously provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the
management of allotted lands." 145 The Court therefore concluded that the General
230 Id. at 1304-05.
Zan Id. at 1305. In Part ill of its opinion, the court distinguished a number of cases cited by the
government for the proposition that the court had no jurisdiction to hear a breach of trust suit. In
some of those cases, the court reasoned, plaintiffs had failed to cite a statute, treaty, agreement,
regulation or executive order which could be read as establishing a trust relationship. In the
remaining cases, plaintiff's had failed to cite a statute empowering the court to grant the relief
requested. Id. at 1305-06,
239
 495 U.S. 535 (1980).
240 Id. Justices Brennan and Stevens joined a dissenting opinion' of Justice White. Id. at 546
(White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger took no part in the decision of the Court. Id. at 546.
241 Id. at 542.
242 Id. at 546.
id. at 546 & n.7. See .supra text accompanying note 237.
2" Id. at 538 (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 398).
145 Id. at 542.
NG Id.
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Allotment Act trust was of a limited nature not encompassing federal management of
timber resources and not conferring any substantive rights- 247
The Court gave three reasons for reaching this result. First, the Court read the
General Allotment Act as indicating that Congress intended the allottee to use the land
for agricultural or grazing purposes; the allouee, and not the government, was to manage
the land.'" Second, the Court reasoned that Congress had inserted the trust language in
the Act solely to prevent alienation and state taxation of the land. 249 Finally, the Court.
interpreted the Act as neither requiring nor authorizing federal management of timber
allotments,'" The Court stated that the Secretary of the Interior lacked general authority
to manage Indian timber until passage of the 1910 Act.'
Justices Brennan and Stevens concurred in Justice White's dissenting opinion. 252
Justice White wrote that the trust language in the General Allotment Act imposed
fiduciary duties on the United States. 253 He reasoned that the Act explicitly created a trust,
and that a common-law trust imposes fiduciary duties on t he trustee.' Because the Act
failed to define the word "trust," it should be given its "ordinary meaning."' This
reading of the Act was strengthened by the well-established existence of the federal
guardianship of Indians and their lands at the time of its enactment, according to Justice
White. 256 Furthermore, he reasoned that subsequent federal statutes and administrative
regulations "implicitly acknowledged" the fiduciary duties established by the Act and
"clarified and fleshed out." those duties. 257
Justice White concluded that the government was liable in money damages for the
breach of fiduciary duties created by the Act, because the trustee's accountability in
money damages "is hornbook law. -25BMoreover, he reasoned, prospective equitable relief
would be inadequate.'" He also noted that. the Department of the Interior, in disagree-
ment. with the Solicitor General, who was representing the government. in the case,
maintained that a damages remedy should be available under the Act. 25° For these
reasons, the dissenters maintained that the Act "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating
compensation by the Federal Government. for the damage sustained.' "26 '
247 Id
248 Id. at 542-43.
249 Id. at 543-44.
9" Id. at 545 (citing United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1872) (holding that Indians
could not harvest timber on their land); Act of Feb. 16, 1889, ch. 172, 25 Stat. 673, 25 U.S.C. § 196
(1982) (authorriing cutting of dead, but not live, timber on reservation or allotted land)).
"' Id.
2" Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting).
'54 Id. at 547-48 (White, J., dissenting).
255
	
at 548 (White, J., dissenting).
258 id .
257 Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
'M Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-12 (1959);
C. RoGERT & C. BoGER -r, 3 A. Sco'rr, supra note 7, § 205).
259 Id.
299 Id. (citing Letter of KTUIR1,, Solicitor, supra note 4).
261 Id. (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F,2d
1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
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E. Implications of Mitchell 1 for Breach of Trust Suits
Mitchell I required that statutes alleged to impose fiduciary duties on the government
he construed strictly:21 '2 Mitchell I, therefore, rejected the liberal statutory interpretation
espoused by the courts in Manchester Band ." and Coast Indian Community.'" Those courts
had liberally construed statutes benefiting Indians in favor of the Indians, and had
imposed common-law fiduciary duties on the government exceeding the express statutory
duties.""' Mitchell I, however, required that such duties be expressed unambiguously in a
statute, regulation, or treat y. 266 In contrast to Mitchell I's requirement that statutes alleged
to impose duties on the government be construed strictly, Testan had only required strict
construction in determining whether a statutory duty created a cause of action for money
damages but not in determining whether a statute imposed any duties on the govern-
ment. 267
Because it held that the General Allotment Act did not impose the duties alleged to
have been breached, the Mitchell I Court did not consider whether statutes imposing
fiduciary duties on the government created a cause of action for money damages for
breach.'" By requiring unambiguous language establishing substantive duties, however,
the Court indicated that it would require equally unambiguous language to establish a
cause of action and waive the government's sovereign immunity. 2 "9 Whether the mere
recitation of the word "trust" in a statute would be sufficiently unambiguous to meet the
Mitchell I standard is questionable.
Fortunately for Indian plaintiffs, Mitchell I was not the last word on breach of trust.
litigation. In Mitchell II , the Supreme Court held the government liable in money damages
for mismanagement of allotted timber based on various federal statutes. Although the
Mitchell II opinion purports to he consistent with Mitchell I, Mitchell II repudiates the
Court's analysis in Mitchell 1 .
V. MITCHELL II
On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell I, the Court of Claims
considered whether various federal statutes .'" authorizing the Department of the Interior
262 See supra text accompanying note '246. Arguably, Mitchell I required strict construction of
such statutes only when urged as the basis of a claim for money damages, since there is otherwise no
sovereign immunity problem, The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach in Rincon Band of Mission
Indians v. Harris, 618 F.2d 569, 575 n.8 (1980). The District of Columbia Circuit applied Mitchell I,
however, in suits seeking equitable relief from breaches of statutory duties. North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. (Am.
INDIAN LAW'. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3073, 3076-77 (D.D.C. 1981), aff d sub. nom. Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See Hughes,supra note 70, at 488 (advocating position later taken in Rincon
Band); Newton, supra note 49, at 673-78 (approving Rincon Band and criticizing Hopi Tribe and North
Slope Borough).
26' See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 125 -30.
26' See supra text accompanying notes 105 -06 and 128.
2" See supra text accompanying note 246.
"7 See .supra text accompanying notes 91 - 105.
2"' See 445 U.S. at 542.
2" In dictum, the Court stated: "A waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must be
unequivocably expressed.'" 445 U.S. at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
2" The principle statutes were: 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (1982) (timber sales); 25 U.S.C. § 466
(1982) (promulgation of regulations requiring sustained yield management); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3I8a,
323-325 (1982) (road building and rights-of-way). For a discussion of these statutes, see supra text
accompanying notes 194-208.
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to manage Indian timber created fiduciary duties and a substantive right to money
damages for breaches of those duties."' Once again, the court decided in favor of the
Indians."' This time the Supreme Court affirmed:2" The Supreme Court held that the
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act waive the sovereign immunity of the United States
regarding claims to which the statutes grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction, expressly
rejecting language in Testan and Mitchell I to the contrary. 274 Having found a waiver of
sovereign immunity in the jurisdictional statutes, the Court then construed the substan-
tive legislation more liberally than it had construed the General Allotment Act in Mitchell
1. 275 The Court held that the timber statutes establish a trust relationship,'" and that the
government was liable in money damages for breach of its fiduciary duties as trustee of
Indian timber.'" The Court distinguished Mitchell I on the narrow grounds that the
General Allotment Act did not authorize the federal management of allotted timber,
although the statutes involved in Mitchell II did.'" Mitchell II repudiated the analysis
employed in Mitchell I, however, and established the presumptions that the United States
is acting as a trustee in its management of Indian property and that the government will
he liable in money damages for breach of trust when it mismanages that property. 27"
A. The Court of Claims Decision
On remand from Mitchell 1, the Court of Claims first considered which standard to
apply in determining whether a statute contains a waiver of sovereign immunity.'" The
court interpreted Testan and Mitchell I as requiring only that a waiver be "clear or strong,"
not that it be express."' The court then analyzed the statutes directly related to federal
management of the plaintiffs' forests and lands."' The court held that these statutes
created a fiduciary relationship between the United States and the Indians even though
the statutes do not specifically mention a "trust" or "fiduciary" relationship. 2"3 Such a
relationship normally exists, the court reasoned, when t he government assumes control of
Indian property."' Further, the court viewed the timber • legislation as having
"broadened" the limited trust created by the General Allotment Act to impose fiduciary
duties on the government in its management of Indian forest lands."'
Next, the court considered whether these statutes waived the government's immunity
to suit for money damages for breaches of the fiduciary duties created by the statutes.'"
The court held that the statutes mandated compensation for breach of fiduciary duties, 287
271
 Mitchell II, 664 F.2d 265 (1981) (en bane), aff'd, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
272
 Id.
23 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 211.
2" Id. at 212 & n.8.
' Id. at 224-26.
2" Id. at 224.
277 Id. at 226.
'7' Id. at 224.
278 Id. at 225-26.
"') 664 F.2d at 267-68.
2" Id. at 268-69.
282 id. at 269.
283 Id. at 269-70.
284 Id. at 270.
283 Id.
288 Id. at 273.
287
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reasoning that Congress intended the Indians to receive not only whatever income the
land produced, but also, in the event of mismanagement, the income which they would
have received if the government had managed the land properly.'" Additionally, the
court noted that "[a] trust normally entails the right to compensation for the trustee's
breach," 289 and that prospective equitable relief would be inadequate.'" The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff's could therefore sue for the difference between the income they
actually received from their land and what they would have received had the land been
properly managed in compliance with the statutes and related regulations. In addition,
the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to sue to recover for any diminution of
property value due to government mismanagement."'
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims decision in an opinion written by
Justice Marshall, author of the Mitchell 1 opinion.'" Although the Court had held in Testan
and Mitchell I that neither the Tucker Act nor the Indian Tucker Act waive the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity, the Mitchell II opinion began by reconsidering these hold-
ings.'" The Court held that the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act waive the
2" Id.
"" Id. at 271 (citing G. BOC,ERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 136, 1 862; 3 A. Scour, supra note 7,
205.
29" Id. at 272.
2" Id. at 271. In Part. IV of the opinion, the court dealt with certain other claims of lesser
importance. The court held the government liable for administrative fee deductions in excess of
reasonable amounts authorized by 25 U.S.C. 11 406 -407 (1982). Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at 274. The
court also held that the plaintiffs could sue for the government's failure to invest the actual proceeds
from the sale of Indian timber to earn the best rate of interest available (citing Cheyenne-Arapaho, 512
F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975), discussed supra note 124 and accompanying text), but that plaintiffs could
not recover interest on the amounts they may recover for violations of fiduciary duties, since federal
law prohibits interest on a noncontractual claim against the United Stales unless expressly provided
for by federal statute. Id. at 274 -75 (citing 28 U.S.C. 2516(a) (1982)).
The court rejected the Indians' argument that their claims regarding timber mismanagement
could be brought as claims based on implied contract. Id. at 275. Finally, the court denied the right to
claim damages for issuing fee patents to incompetent Indians or for failure to issue patents to
competent Indians under 25 U.S.C. § 349 and Act of Jan. 24, 1923, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 1185, amended by
Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 901, 1(84), 45 Stat. 992 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 377; repealed
1980), since these statutes are like licensing statutes and do not themselves mandate compensation
for violations.
Judge Nichols wrote a separate opinion, concurring with the court regarding those claims
discussed in Part IV, but dissenting with respect to the majority of the claims. Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at
276 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). While agreeing that the statutes in question created
fiduciary duties on the part of the government, Judge Nichols disagreed that these duties created a
right to money damages. Id. at 282-83 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). He argued that the
court had erred in not applying to the statutes the doctrine of strict construction of consent to be
sued, as required by Mitchell I. Id. at 277 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). Moreover, Judge
Nichols reasoned: "The federal power over Indian lands is so different from that of a private trustee
.. that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust plus a leading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS
(sic) to impose liability on claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed."Id. at 283 (Nichols, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
292 463 U.S. 206 (1983). Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell. Id. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 211-16. Reconsideration was merited because both the Indians and the government
argued that the Tucker Act waived the government's immunity to suit. Brief for Respondents at 114,
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government's immunity to the classes of claims falling within their terms. 294
 Tracing the
legislative history of both Acts, the Court determined that Congress intended the statutes
to waive the government's immunity to suit."' The Court acknowledged that. it had
consistently interpreted the Tucker Act as providing the consent of the United States to
be sued for t he classes of claims within the Tucker Act . 2" Because no executive official can
waive the government's immunity, 297
 the Court reasoned that. the Tucker Act must.
provide consent to claims founded upon contracts and executive regulations.'"The Act
does not distinguish betWeen contractual claims and the other classes of claims within the
Act, the Court noted. 299
Having found that the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act waive the govern-
ment's immunity to certain classes of suits, the Court distinguished between a waiver of
sovereign immunity and a grant of a substantive right to money damages. 3" While the
Tucker Act contains the former, the Court stated, the substantive right must be found
under the Constitution, or in a treaty, statute, or regulation which " 'can - fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.' " 31 ' The Court indicated that the statutes alleged to grant the substantive right
need not be construed in the strict manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity
since immunity has been waived by the Tucker Act."' The Court then examined the
substantive statutes and regulations upon which the plaintiff's based their claim. 3" Distin-
guishing them from the hare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the Court held
Mitchell11, 463 U.S. 206 (1983); Brief for United States at 19n. I 2, Mitchell , 463 U.S. 206 (1983). See
also Brief for Amid Curiae Shoshone Tribe at 17-29, Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). In Mitchell I the
Indians had accepted Testan's holding that the Tucker Act does not waive sovereign immunity. Brief
for Respondents at 12, 28, 29, 31, Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). Moreover, the Court had expressly
stated that the Tucker Act provided the government's consent to suit in two post-Testan breach of
contract cases. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 734 (1982); Hatzlachh
Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (per curiam). The real issues in a Tucker Act case,
the parties agreed, is whether the statutes imposing duties on the federal government create a
substantive right to money damages. Brief for Respondents at 14, Mitchell 463 U.S. 206 (1983);
Brief for United States at 19 n.12, Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). The government continued to
argue, however, that in deciding whether a substantive statute gives rise to a cause of action for
money damages against the United States, the statute "should be construed in the conservative
manner appropriate to a waiver of sovereign immunity." Id.
2" 463 U.S. at 212 & n.8.
2 '5 Id. at 212-15.
2"" Id. at 215.
291 Id. at 215-16 & 11.14.
29" "Me Court noted that in two post-Testan contract cases the Court had "explicitly stated that
the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at 215 (citing Army & Air Force Exch.
Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 734 (1982); Haulachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460
(1980) (per curiam)).
1" Id.
Id. at 216.
301 Id. at 217 (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372
F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Ca. 1967))).
302 Id. at 218-19. The Court stated; "'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves
hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of
construction where consent has been announced.'" Id, (quoting United States v. Aetna Surety Co.,
338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949) (quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153
N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardoza, J.))).
Id. at 219-28. See also supra text accompanying notes 194-208 for a discussion of these
statutes.
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that the statutes and regulations invoked in Mitchell 11 give the government full responsi-
bility to manage Indian resources for the benefit of the lndians. 31' The Court therefore
concluded that these statutes "establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of
the United States' fiduciary duties."""'
The Court gave three reasons for reaching this conclusion. First., according to the
Court, the statutes and regulations establish comprehensive federal management of
Indian timber and a concurrent federal government duty to manage that timber in the
best. interests of the Indian owner."' The Court. noted that the Department of Interior's
earliest_ regulations implementing the 1910 Act "addressed virtually every aspect of forest
management," 3"7 and recognized the Depart ment's obligation to " 'manag[e] the Indian
forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper
protection and improvement of the forests.' 'The Court found that. Congress imposed
even stricter duties upon the Interior Department in later statutes.'" These statutes and
the regulations implementing them,"" the Court stated, "establish the 'comprehensive'
responsibilities of the Federal Government in managing the harvesting of Indian
timber."'" Second, the Court announced a general rule that a trust relationship arises
whenever the federal government assumes comprehensive control over Indian property
unless Congress provides otherwise. 2 ' 2 Finally, the Court cited the undisputed existence
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people" to
support its construction of the Indian statutes."' The Court stated that the government
has long acted as a fiduciary in its dealings with the Indians.""
The Court next considered whether these statutory fiduciary duties created a sub-
stantive right to monetary damages under the Tealan "fairly interpreted as mandating
'"4 463 U.S. at 224.
3(15 Id.
3" Id. at 224.
3
"7 Id. at 220.
3°F Id. (quoting 1911 REGuLATIoNs, xupra note 198, at 4).
3"3 h.t. at 220-21. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 6, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §
466 (1982), directs the Secretary of the Interior to manage Indian forests "on the principle of
sustained-yield management." The Act of April 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186, 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982),
directs the Secretary to consider "the needs a n d best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs" in
managing allotted timber.
3 "' 25 C.F.R. Part 163 (1985). 'flue Court noted that "Nhe regulatory scheme was designed to
assure that the Indians receive 'the benefit of whatever profit [the forest) is capable of yielding.' '' 463
U.S. at 222 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 149 (1980) (quoting 25
C.F,R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979) (current version at 25 C.F.R. § 163.3(d) (1985)))). The Gourt discussed
federal management of Indian timber at great length in While Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 145-48.
This case presented the question of whether a state could enforce its motor carrier license tax and its
fuel tax against a non-Indian corporation conducting logging operations entirely within an Indian
reservation under contracts entered into with a tribal corporation (which had contracted with the
United States to harvest Indian timber). The Court held that the application of the tax was
pre-empted by federal law due to the comprehensive federal management of Indian timber. Id, at
148.
3" 463 U.S, at 222 (quoting White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 145). The Court further stated:
"The pattern of pervasive federal control evident in the area of timber sales and timber management
applies equally to grants of rights-of-way and to management of Indian funds." hi. at 225 11.29.
311 Id. at 225. The Court noted that "[apt of the elements of a common-law trust are present: a
trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allonees) and a trust corpus (Indian timber,
lands, and funds)." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcomi) or TRusTs § 2, comment h (1959)).
313 Id.
114 Id.
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compensation" standard." 5 The Court held that the statutes did create such a right,
reasoning that a trust implicitly includes the right of the injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee in money damages for breach of fiduciary duties. 3 'R "Given the existence of a trust
relationship," the Court stated, "it naturally follows that the Government should be liable
in damages for breach of its fiduciary duties." 317 The Court stated that, along with other
federal courts, it previously recognized the right of Indians to sue the government in
money damages for breach of trust.'
To buttress its conclusion, the Court also maintained that a damages remedy would
further the purposes of the statutes and regulations.") Absent such a remedy, the court
reasoned, there would be little to prevent federal officials from mismanaging Indian
property.'" The Court rejected the government's argument that federal mismanagement
of Indian lands could be adequately remedied by equitable relief.'" Most Indian allottees
would be unable to monitor federal management of their lands, according to the Court. 322
The Court also reasoned that. the Indian beneficiary should not be charged with supervis-
ing the actions taken on his behalf by the federal t rustee," 3
 and that equitable relief "may
be next to worthless" in restoring a forest damaged through mismanagement."
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, in which justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
joined.325 Justice Powell accepted the government's argument that the right to sue the
United States for damages must be expressly stated in the substantive legislation on which
the claim is brought.'" The dissent stated that the Court adopted this rule of strict
construction in Mitchel, I, and that in rejecting it here the Court in effect was overruling
Mitchell I sub silentio.'" The majority opinion, the dissent argued, was based on two
dubious assumptions. First, the dissent asserted, the Court decided that the statutes create
or recognize fiduciary duties.'" The federal-Indian trust relationship, according to jus-
tice Powell, is not. like an ordinary private trust." Rather, he reasoned, the main effect of
this trust. is to grant the federal government pervasive control over Indian affairs to
immunize Indians' from state control.'"
315 Id. at 226.
311i Id.
317 Id, (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-212 (1959); G. BOGERT &.G. BOGERT,
supra note 136, § 862; 3 A. Scam supra note 7, § 205).
31 ' Id. (citing, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295-300 (1942); United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 1003, 1009-10 (1935); Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364,
1372-73 (Cl. Cl. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973)).
31E7 id .
32" Id. at 227.
321
..122 Id, The Court noted chat. many allottees are poorly educated, most do not live on their
allotments and many do not even know where their allotments are located. Id.
323 Id.
324 id.
"" Id. at 228 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
32' Id. at 228-30 (Powell, J., dissenting).
327
	 at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting),
37g Id. at 234 (Powell, J., dissenting).
329 Id. (quoting Mitchell II, 664 F.2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting)). Seesupra
note 291 for a discussion of Judge Nichols' opinion.
33° Id. at 234-35 (Powell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent questioned why the Court
characterized the federal-Indian relationship as a trusteeship rather than as a guardianship although
the Court often has described the relationship as a guardianship. Id. at 234-35 n.8 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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According to justice Powell, the second "dubious assumption" the Court made was
that because a trust normally includes the right of the injured beneficiary to sue for
breach, and because injunctive relief would be inadequate, Congress must have au-
thorized recovery for breach of trust."' The dissent found " '[n]othing on the face' """ of
any of the timber statutes to establish that Congress had "consented" to a breach of trust
action," and found no support for the majority's conclusion that a damages remedy
" 'naturally follows — 334 from the existence of a trust relationship." Finally, the dissent
argued that the possible inadequacy of injunctive relief should have no bearing in
deciding whether a damages remedy is available."""
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS IN MITCHELL I AND MITCHELL II
In Mitchell I, the Court held that the General Allotment Act did not impose fiduciary
duties on the government to manage Indian timber."' In Mitche1111, however, the Court
held that other statutes did impose such duties on the government. 338 The Court also held
that breach of such duties gave rise to a cause of action for money damages."'"' This
section of the easenote will analyze these decisions," and their implications in future
breach of trust litigation. 3"
A. Establishing the Trust
In Mitchell 1, the Court held, incorrectly, that the General Allotment Act. did not
impose fiduciary duties on the government to manage allotted timber." The incorrect
decision was due to the Court's improper use of strict construction,' its restrictive
reading of the General Allotment Act contrary to Supreme Court precedent," and to the
undue significance it attached to the Act's legislative history" and to the Act's failure to
authorize federal management of allotted timber."
In Mitchell I, the Court incorrectly construed the General Allotment Act conserva-
331 Id, at 234 (Powell, J., dis.senting).
332 Id, at 236 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59
(1978)).
333 Id.
334 Id. (quoting id. at 226).
33.' The dissent disagreed with the Court's reading of Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286 (1942), and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), which the Court cited for the
proposition that it had previously recognized the right of Indians to sue the government for money
damages for breach of trust. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. The dissent read Seminole
Nation as involving "a claim to compel payments expressly prescribed by treaty." 463 U.S. at 237 n.10
(Powell, J., dissenting) (citing 316 U.S. at 296-97). The dissent read Creek Nation as holding the
government liable for an uncompensated fifth amendment taking. Id.
334' 463 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., dissenting).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 240-51,
33  See supra text accompanying note 304.
339 See supra text accompanying note 317.
34" See infra text accompanying notes 342-400.
34 ' See infra text accompanying notes 401-14.
34' See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
343 See infra text accompanying notes 347-53.
341 See infra text accompanying notes 354-60.
345 See infra text accompanying notes 361-65.
341 See infra text accompanying notes 366-70.
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tively in the manner of a waiver of sovereign inummity" 7
 in determining whether the Act
created fiduciary duties. The Court did so due to its incorrect"' and now-discarded"'
belief, founded in equally incorrect language in Teslan, that. neither the Tucker Act nor
the Indian Tucker Act. provide the government's consent. to be sued. 35° Furthermore,
even if the doctrine of sovereign immunity required that statutes be construed strictly in
determining whether they create a statutory duty,' the Court should have construed the
General Allotment Act liberally to the benefit of the Indians in view of the existence of a
general federal-Indian trust relationship 352
 — the standard of construction which it
apparently used in Mitchell II
The reasoning of the Court in Mitchell I that the allot tee and not the government was
to manage the land, and that the land was to be used for farming or grazing,'" is
inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Payne, for example,
the Court ordered the government to allot timber lands on the Quinault Reservation. 355
Similarly, in Halbert v. United States, the Court approved the Department of the Interior's
practice of allotting Quinault lands to nonresidents."" The practical result of Payne and
Halbert was that the Quinault Reservation was fully divided into allotments of dense
forest,"57 the value of which was almost entirely in timber,'" and that most of the allottees
did not live on their allotments let alone use them for farming or grazing. 359 Furthermore,
after the Interior Department had undertaken management of tribal timber pursuant to
the 1910 Act, many Quinault allot.tees took their allotments subject to long-term timber
harvesting contracts, thereby precluding them from managing or farming the land. 3"
The Mitchell I decision is therefore inconsistent. with Payne and Halbert and with the
Department of interior's practice of allotting lands subject to timber harvesting contracts.
The Court placed too much emphasis in Mitchell I on the legislative history of the Act.
in holding that. Congress intended the "trust" language solely to prevent alienation and
state taxation of the allotment."" 1 In offering the amendment adding the trust language to
a predecessor bill, Senator Dawes, the bill's sponsor, explained that, the change was
intended to "make it impossible to raise the question of [state] taxation." 3 "2 The bill,
347 See supra text accompanying note 246.
'48 See infra text accompanying notes 380-84.
349 See supra text accompanying note 294.
See supra text accompanying notes 244 -45.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 262 and 267.
3" See supra text accompanying note 119. In Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), a case
involving allotted forest land on the Quinault Reservation, the Court construed the General Allot-
ment Act according to the rule that. " Idloubt ful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak
and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, subject 10 its protection and good faith.' "Id.
at 6 - 7 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
'5' See supra text accompanying note 313.
'54 See supra text accompanying note 248.
355 264 U.S. 446, 449 (1924). See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
356 283 U.S. 753, 760-62 (1931). See supra text accompanying note 182.
35' See supra text accompanying note 187.
1" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 228 (quoting Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956)).
359 Id. at 227.
United States v. Eastman, 118 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 635 (1941).
an See supra text accompanying note 248.
3"2 13 CONC. REC. 321 1 (1882). The bill under consideration at the time was a bill to allot the
Umatilla Reservation. Senator Dawes offered, and the Senate approved, an identical amendment to
S. 1455, the predecessor bill to the General Allotment Act, the same day. Id. at 3212.
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however, already expressly provided that the land would not he subject to taxation. 3ti3 As
one commentator has noted, according to the Court's interpretation, "Senator Dawes'
amendment did [no] more than merely replace the clear and specific language [of the
original bill] with more abstract language meaning the very same thing.' Especially in
view of the context of the federal-Indian trust relationship, the trust language in the Act
should have been interpreted more broadly to give it its ordinary meaning." 5
The fundamental flaw in Mitchell I was the Court's reasoning that because the
General Allotment Act did not authorize the federal management of allotted timber,
breach of trust suits for mismanagement of allotted timber could not be premised on that
Act. 3" It is true, of course, that the government was not authorized to manage allotted
timber prior to the 1910 Act."' The Court should have followed the reasoning of Justice
White's dissenting opinion, however, that the 1910 Act and subsequent legislation were
properly viewed as having "fleshed out" the trust created by the Allotment Act . 3"s Thus, in
undertaking the management of allotted "trust" timber under the 1910 Act. and subse-
quent legislation, the government was acting in its capacity as trustee under the General
Allotment Act, and was hound by fiduciary duties. Implicit in the Court's rationale is the
incorrect assumption that the timber on allotted lands is not subject to the General
Allotment. Act trust. This assumption is inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions
ordering the allotment of timber land on the Quinault Reservation,"" and considering
timber on allotted lands as subject to the trust.'" Reading these cases together, the
principle that emerges is that the General Allotment Act placed allotted timber in trust,
which trust the government has administered through subsequent legislation.
In Mitchell 11, the Court of Claims drew on this principle in holding that the 1910 Act
and subsequent timber management statutes imposed fiduciary duties on the federal
government."' The court reasoned, in part., that these statutes broadened the General
363 The language replaced by the amendment read as follows:
Provided, That the title to lands acquired by Indians under the provisions of this act
shall not he subject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or by
the judgment, decree, or the order of any court, but shall be and remain inalienable
and not subject to taxation, lien, or incumbrance for any purpose ....
13 CONG. REC. 3211 (1882).
3" Hughes, supra note 70, at 481.
3' 5 See supra note 119.
36" See supra text accompanying notes 250-51,
387
	
supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
368 Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 224 and
250. This argument is essentially the argument made by the Indians in their petition for rehearing.
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing, Mitchell 1, 446 U.S. 992 (1980) (rehearing denied). Respon-
dents argued that United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924), Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753
(1931), and Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956), require reading the 1910 Act and the General
Allotment Act as one statutory plan. Respondents' Petition for Rehearing, Mitchell 1, 446 U.S. 992
(1980) (rehearing denied). See also F. COHEN, supra note 12, at 134 (calling the 1910 Act "a major
revision of the General Allotment Act").
369 United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 449 (1924). Cf. Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753,
760-62 (1931) (ordering the allotment of Quinault forest land to nonresidents). See supra notes 182,
185-86, and 355-60 and accompanying text.
3" Starr v, Campbell, 208 U.S. 527, 534 (1908). See supra note 185 and accompanying text. See
also United States v. Eastman, 118 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.), cell. denied, 314 U.S. 635 (1941). Cf. Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
3" 664 F.2d at 270.
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Allotment Act trust to include the federal management of Indian timber.'" The Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of' Claims decision in Mitchell II, holding that the timber
management statutes created a federal trusteeship of Indian timber."" As the Court
noted, the statutes establish the "comprehensive" responsibilities of the federal govern-
ment in managing Indian timber. 374
 Congress has directed the Department of the Interior
to consider the best interests of the allouee in managing the timber. 375
 The Interior
Department recognized long ago its obligation to " 'manag[e] the Indian forest so as to
obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians "376 In its management of Indian lands
and resources, the Interior Department considers itself to be subject to fiduciary duties.'"
Reading the statutes in light of the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship
between the United States and the Indian people, it is reasonable to conclude that the
statutes impose fiduciary duties on the government."'" Moreover, the timber statutes
could properly be viewed as having broadened the limited trust created by the General
Allotment Act to impose general fiduciary obligations on the Government in the man-
agement and operation of the forest lands with which Interior Department was en-
I rust ed. 379
In conclusion, Mitchell 1 was wrongly decided. The Mitchell I Court should have held
that the General Allotment Act, which expressly placed allotted timber land in trust,
imposed fiduciary duties on the United States in its management of those lands under
subsequent statutes. Mitchell I, however, has little meaning in light of Mitchell II which
correctly held that statutes authorizing the federal management of Indian lands impose
fiduciary duties on the government. Mitchell II establishes the presumption that the
federal government, in managing Indian property, is bound by fiduciary dunes.
B. Liability of the United States for Breach of Trust
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court correctly held that the Tucker Act and the Indian
Tucker Act waive the sovereign immunity of the United States regarding claims founded
upon federal statutes and regulations.'" Prior to the Testan decision, the Court had
consistently construed the Tucker Act as containing a waiver of sovereign immunity. 3"t
The legislative histories of both statutes indicate that their purpose was to provide the
consent of the United Stales to be sued for those classes of claims falling wit hin their
terms. 3"z It is evident that these statutes provide the government's consent to suit for
contract claims, for executive officials cannot waive the government's immunity to suit.'"
3" Id.
343 463 U.S. at 224.
3" Id. at 2'22.
375 25 U.S.C.	 406(a) (1982).
"' Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 220 (quoting 1911 REGULATIONS, supra note 198, at 4).
"T See Letter of Krulitz, Solicitor, supra note 4, at 2a.
3t8 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225.
3" Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at 270. See also Justice White's dissent in Mitchell I: "This argument [that
the General Allotment Act trust does not extend to the management of forest lands] takes too narrow
a view of the subsequent statutory and administrative developments which clarified and fleshed out
that duty." 445 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
380 See supra text accompanying notes 292 -95.
381 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 and '296. Furthermore, prior to Mitchell I, the Court
of Claims had construed the Indian Tucker Act as containing a waiver of sovereign immunity. See
Navajo Tribe v. United States, 586 F.2d 192, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
382 See supra text accompanying notes 53 - 81 and 295.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 296 -98.
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This consent to suit logically applies to other classes of claims within the terms of the
statutes as well, since these statutes make no distinction between those claims and contrac-
tual claims."'
The issue, then, in a damages action against the United States founded upon federal
statutes or regulations is not whether the statutes provide the government's consent to
suit, but whether they create a substantive right to money damages. Both the majority and
the dissenting opinions in Mitchell II agree that "[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitu-
tion, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker ACt.. "333 Something
more is needed. The dissent agreed with the government. that the substantive right must
be expressly stated in the statute or regulation. 386 In effect, the dissent would require a
second waiver of sovereign immunity, the first being found in the Tucker Act, thus
rendering the Tucker Act waiver superfluous. The majority properly rejected this argu-
ment. 387
The majority stated that the substantive right exists if the statutes or regulations
"'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for
the damages sustained.' " 3" Although this standard of construction is arguably correct, it
is too vague to be very helpful. 389 A better standard might be for the court to "consider the
decisional law on the compensahility of claims of the same general type." 39° This standard
finds support in the congressional debate on the original Court of Claims Act, and in an
early Court of Claims case."' Congress anticipated that the court would decide cases
according to established rules of justice, and follow those rules as precedent."' In its first
case, 393 the Court of Claims considered the principles that should govern the court in their
adjudications upon the cases within their jurisdiction. 19` The court stated:
If a claim he alleged to be "founded upon any law of Congress," in the words
of the [Court of Claims Act,] we must construe such law, and ascertain its
meaning by applying it to those rules of construction which a wide and
long-continued experience has determined to be the best adapted to that
purpose; and the same course must be pursued where a claim is founded
"upon any regulation of an executive department."'
Applying this standard to actions against the United States by Indians or Indian tribes for
violations of statutory duties, two rules emerge: first, the statutes should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the I ndians,  according to well-established principles; and second, if
the statutes create a trust, ordinary principles of trust law should apply insofar as they are
not contrary to the express or clearly implied intent of Congress.
394 See supra text accompanying note 299.
395 463 U.S. at 216. See afro id. at 228-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 326-27.
337 See supra text accompanying note 302.
asa 463 U.S. at 217 (quoting Tesian, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States,
372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
a" The dissent in Mitchell II, for example, read this standard as requiring an express grant of a
cause of action for money damages in the statute. 463 U.S. at 229 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3" Orme, supra note 51, at 881.
33 ' Todd v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. No. 1 (1856).
39= CONG. GLOB:, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1854) (remarks of Senator Clayton).
333 Todd v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. No. I (1856).
39' Id. at 5 (quoting Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612).
393 Id. In another portion of the opinion, the Court applied "the rules which regulate the liability
of parties in ordinary suits." Id. at 9.
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Application of these rules of construction to the timber and land management
statutes leads to the conclusion that the United States should be liable for violating
fiduciary duties imposed by these statutes. The statutes may be viewed either as establish-
ing a trust, 396 or as extending the limited trust imposed by the General Allotment Act to
the management of forest lands."' The United States should therefore be liable for
breach of its fiduciary duties, for "[i]t is well-established that, a trustee is accountable in
damages for breaches of trust. " 398 The Court was therefore correct in Mitchell II when it.
held that the statutes could fairly he interpreted as mandating compensation by the
federal government for timber mismanagement. 399
This result is consistent with the Testan decision. The Court in Testan found that the
Classification Act did not create a substantive right to money damages in light of the rule
that an individual is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly
appointed to it.' 1 " In a breach of trust case, on the other hand, the established rule that a
beneficiary is entitled to money damages applies.
Mitchell II was correct in deciding that. the United States is liable in money damages
for mismanagement. of Indian timber. Because the government is acting as a trustee in
managing Indian property, it should be liable for breach of fiduciary duties just as are
other trustees. Mitchell II, therefore, correctly establishes a presumption that the United
States will be liable for mismanagement of Indian property.
C. Litigating Breach of Trust Cases after Mitchell II
Mitchell established two important principles in breach of trust cases. First, Mitchell
II announced a presumption that the United States is acting as a trustee when managing
Indian property."' Second, under the rule espoused in Mitchell 11, the United States will
be liable for breaches of statutory duties and the ordinary duties of a private trustee."'
As to the first principle, the Mitchell II Court staled:
[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over
tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with
respect. to such monies or properties (unless Congress has provided oth-
erwise) even though not hing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or
fiduciary connection."'
Mitchell II therefore stands for the proposition that whenever the United States manages
Indian resources under congressional authority it is acting in its capacity as trustee unless
the statute empowering it to manage the resources expressly states otherwise. This
principle is not new; as one commentator wrote two years before the government moved
to dismiss Mitchell I: "Reading all the [breach of trust] cases together, t he principle that
emerges is that Congress intends specific adherence to the trust responsibility by execu-
a" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
397 Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at 270.
3" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 'FROSTS §§ 205-12 (1959); G.
BOGERT & G. Boce.RT, supra note 136, § 205; 3 A. Scorr, supra note 7, § 205).
399
 463 U.S. at 226.
4°° 424 U.S. at 402.
401 See supra text accompanying notes 308.
4°' See infra text accompanying notes 406-14.
4°' 463 U.S. at 225 (quoting Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. CI. 1980)).
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Live officials unless it has expressly provided otherwise." 404 Mitchell II is the most forceful
and authoritative statement of this principle.
Mitchell 11 reverses the presumption against the establishment of a trust employed in
Mitchell 1. 405 Although the Court did not. expressly overrule the earlier decision, the
limited holding of that case should not be an obstacle to Indians suing the government for
mismanagement of their property. Plaintiffs need only base their claim on the statutes,
treaties, or regulations specifically authorizing the federal government to manage the
property involved.
Mitchell II establishes that the government is liable not only for violations of express
statutory duties, but also for breaches of common-law fiduciary duties not expressly
mandated by statute. Although this principle is not clearly articulated in the opinion, it is
evident from the Court's reliance on the common law of trusts to establish the govern-
ment's liability for breach that the Court would borrow other common-law principles in
determining the scope of that liability.'" Moreover, the dissent in Mitchell II reads the
majority's decision as holding the United States liable in money damages "for statutory
violations and other departures from the rules that govern private fiduciaries." 417 Because the
Court did not discuss the scope of the government's liability in detail, it appears that the
Court implicitly approved of the approach taken by the Court of Claims. It is therefore
necessary to look to that court's opinion to determine the law on this issue. The Court of
Claims held the government liable for breaches of fiduciary duties not specifically pre-
scribed by statute." For example, construing the forest management statutes" together
with statutes authorizing the Interior Department to grant rights-of-way' and build
roads*" across Indian lands, the court held the government liable for loss of income or
property value occasioned by the Interior Department's unjustified failure or refusal to
build or maintain the roads called for by proper harvesting and forest care. 412
Reading the Court. of Claims and the Supreme Court decisions together, t he princi-
ple that emerges is that the federal government, in its management of Indian property, is
liable for violations of express statutory duties and for breaches of common-law fiduciary
duties. The government's liability for breaches of common-law fiduciary duties is limited
only by its authority to manage Indian property. Where it does not have the authority to
act as a common-law trustee, of course, it cannot be held liable for failing to do so: 4 '
4 (}4 Chambers, supra note 5, at 1248.
405 See supra text accompanying notes 262-69.
4U6 See supra text accompanying notes 316-17.
'"? 463 U.S. at 230 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
4" Mitchell H, 664 F.2d at 270-73.
"9 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407, 466 (1982).
4'0 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-325 (1984
4 " 25 U.S.C. § 318a (1982).
412 664 F.2d at 273. The court did state, however, that it would not allow recovery for "conse-
quential, indirect damages which a private cestui might possibly recover because of his trustee's
derelictions," Id. at 271. Consequential damages for which plaintiffs could not collect included
"indirect or consequential business, economic, or personal damages due to the loss (total or partial) of
their property, or personal, psychological, or social harm experienced by the Indian owners or the
tribe as a consequence of federal mismanagement of their property." Id. at 274. Such indirect
damages probably would not be allowed in an ordinary breach of trust suit either. See generally G.
Boc;Eicr & C. BocERT, supra note 136, § 862.
413 For example, while a private trustee can invest trust funds in any number of ways, the
government's choice of investment of Indian trust funds is limited by statute. 25 U.S.0 §§, 151-165
(1982).
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Insofar as it. has authority to manage Indian property, however, it must act consistently
with the principles applicable to common-law fiduciaries. When it does not, the govern-
ment will be liable for any diminution of the value of the trust property, and the
difference between the income yielded by the property and the income it would have
yielded had it been managed properly. 414
CONCLUSION
Two important. principles emerge from Mitchell II: first, where the federal govern-
ment manages Indian property under congressional authority, a trust relationship pre-
sumptively exists unless Congress expressly provides otherwise; and second, the United
States is liable in money damages for violations of its fiduciary obligations imposed by the
trust unless Congress provides otherwise. Mitchell II will likely result in better federal
management of' Indian lands, by providing that the Indian beneficiaries be made whole
for breaches of the government's fiduciary obligations. While it may be better for tribes to
manage their own land and the lands of their members rather than relying on the federal
trusteeship," 5
 Mitchell II provides that as long as Indians have to rely on the federal
trusteeship, 'the United States will be accountable for its actions judged by common-law
fiduciary standards in an action for money damages in the newly constituted United
States Claims Court, formerly known as the Court, of Claims.'"
MICH AEL Roy
414 See .supen text accompanying note 291.
415 See, e.g., C. HALL, THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP, 53-54 (2d ed. 1981).
41" See .supra note 65.
